Sunday, October 27, 2013

The Manila Anti-Referendum Rallies of October 1976

The Setting

In 1976, Philippine martial law was four years old, President Ferdinand E. Marcos was secure in his power, and  the economy was not much of a worry. It was growing,  and the balance of payments deficit had been solved through heavy borrowing. To project stability, the regime inaugurated the huge and ultra-modern Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) in September. Its initial hosting was the 1976 IMF-World Bank meeting.

The First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, had been Governor of Metro-Manila for more than a year. She was her usual self erecting buildings and travelling abroad, with or without her husband. The PICC was  her pet project. She and President Marcos went to the Soviet Union in June, for their first official state visit. They established diplomatic relations with the USSR on that jaunt. 

Alone, Imelda had visited the US in January, and earned a brief and awkward appointment with First Lady Betty Ford, where the two exchanged gifts. To my recollection, it was in mid-year that Imelda was given the nickname “Iron Butterfly” by the foreign press, for her tenacity against her enemies.

In sports, the Philippines had sent 14 athletes to the Montreal Olympics in July, its smallest contingent since 1932. The Philippine delegation was small because of the absence of the basketball team, due to our first -time failure to qualify for the Olympic basketball competitions.  Meanwhile, the world gasped in awe at a diminutive 14-year-old child Romanian gymnast named Nadia Comaneci.

In the Philippine Basketball Association (PBA), the Crispa Redmanizers won all three conferences for their first “Grand Slam.” William “Bogs” Adornado was named Most Valuable Player (MVP).

In show business, the Second Metro-Manila Film Festival was held. Ganito Kami Noon… Paano Kayo Ngayon won Best Film, with its lead, Christopher de Leon, winning Best Actor. Hilda Koronel won the Best Actress award for her performance as an impoverished woman out for revenge in Insiang.

On August 16, 1976, there was a magnitude 8.0 earthquake between Mindanao and Sulu which killed 5,000 to 8,000 people. The tsunami it generated did most of the killing, especially in Sulu, and in the cities of Zamboanga and Pagadian. I started in my first job ever in July, as youth coordinator for the social action arm of the Catholic Bishops Conference (CBCP), an outfit called National Secretariat of Social Action (NASSA). NASSA got very busy in the relief operations for the victims of this earthquake and I helped pack relief goods.

I remember that when we had finished packing a shipment at the NASSA headquarters in Pasay City, Sr. Marilu Limgenco MM, a committed Maryknoll nun,  told me there was a PAF C130 at the domestic airport ready to bring the goods to Pagadian City, and that could I accompany her. I begged-off because I had a scheduled meeting that day.  To this day, I regret that decision.

In May, a typhoon inundated much of Central Luzon for a week, killing 60 people. The University of the Philippines Consultative Committee for Student Affairs (UP Concomsa) launched Operasyon Tulong (Operation Help) to bring relief goods to the affected areas. I was attending a meeting in a small hut in Hagonoy, Bulacan when the flood started to rise threateningly. We cut short the meeting and went to UP to attend Operasyon Tulong's convening meeting at UP Women's Home behind Vinzons Hall. Former Concomsa member Renato S. Velasco presided.     

The Rallies of October

The really important events in politics were denied the public by the Marcos media. Everything was focused on the referendum-plebiscite. Hardly reported, for example, was the nascent anti- martial law movement. There were three significant protest rallies in Manila in 1976, but the landmark events, noted for their sheer audacity,  received paltry coverage.   They all happened in October.

The first one occurred on October 3, 1976. It originated as an indoor rally in the auditorium of St. Paul College Manila, with Sen. Jovito Salonga as the main speaker. Numbering around 5,000 persons, the main body spilled out into Herran St. (present-day Pedro Gil) and managed to occupy a portion of Taft Avenue for about an hour after which it self-dispersed.  

The second and third ones, which were more defiant, took place on October 10, 1976 in front of De La Salle University on Taft Avenue and Plaza Miranda, respectively.  The Taft rally was held at about 3:00 in the afternoon while the Plaza Miranda rally happened at about 9 pm. The daring activists pulled no punches in denouncing martial law and Marcos’ human rights violations, shouting one illegal slogan after another.   They were both about 5,000 strong, The second rally was violently dispersed by the police with truncheons. However, it lasted more than an hour --- long enough for it to attract a large crowd of innocent onlookers, and a news article with a photo in the next day’s captive newspapers.

As they scampered from the police, the participants pasted conspicuous 3” by 12” self-adhesive stickers on walls, electric posts, and bus and jeepney interiors. The stickers bore the slogan “BMI Ngayon.” BMI Ngayon meant “Batas Militar Ibagsak Ngayon,” and was  a teaser for a planned huge rally to be held in 1977. Even the Leftists had some advertising sense. 

The 1976 Referendum-Plebiscite

The October 1976 rallies were protesting the approaching national “referendum-plebiscite” which was to be held October 16-17 1976.

In this exercise, some 42,000 barangays nationwide were to vote a) if martial law were to be continued, and b) to ratify proposed amendments to the 1973 Constitution. The said amendments would substitute the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP) for the regular Batasang Pambansa pursuant to Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031, and 1032.

At that time, Marcos was concerned about the legal status of his four-year-old martial law regime. Marcos, after all, was a lawyer by training.  He wanted that his martial law was standing on firm legal grounds. He reasoned that a resounding favorable vote from the Filipino people, via a referendum, was the best legal validation for martial law. Hence the first question in the referendum plebiscite.

At the same time, Marcos needed a transitional body for the country’s eventual shift to the parliamentary system, and the IBP was to serve that purpose. In that parliamentary system, Marcos, as his scheme would have it, would become the Philippines’ first Prime Minister. Hence, the second question in the referendum-plebiscite.

The referendum-plebiscite was also meant by Marcos to convey the impression that he was consulting the Filipino people in matters affecting their welfare and future. Such an image was important in conveying a benevolent image and fostering a climate of “normalization” for what otherwise was a brutally repressive regime.

Left-Led Opposition to Marcos

Politically, the strongest opposition to Marcos was the Philippine Left, led by the “revitalized” Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). The Maoist CPP had weathered the arrest of politburo member Jose Luneta and other prominent Leftist figures in January, and had, by this time, regrouped nationwide, especially in the Metro-Manila area.

In Metro-Manila, the CPP had laid out a respectable political infrastructure, an ample mass base, and had established tactical alliances with middle-of-the-road politicians. The latter were either sympathetic to its cause or had no choice but to align with it.

In contrast to its student dominated mass base in the immediate pre-martial law years, the CPP in Metro-Manila now relied more on the support of thousands of workers under the Leftist “Bukluran” federation, urban poor under the Zone One Tondo Organizations (ZOTO), and religious activists under the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP) and the National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP).

The Manila-Rizal committee of the CPP (MR) was now under the leadership of the rambunctious Filemon “Ka Popoy” Lagman. Lagman’s vision was the development of a mass uprising in Manila, which he called “Rebolusyonaryong Sigwa,” or revolutionary storm. The center of the maelstrom was intended by Lagman to be right in the political center of the city of Manila, meaning Plaza Miranda or in front of Malacañang Palace. Meanwhile, according to Lagman's plan, preparatory rallies, like the ones that happened in 1976,  were to be staged, the better to build momentum for the Sigwa. These pick-up rallies Lagman called "Rebolusyonaryong Unos," or revolutionary mini-storms. 

In his numerous fiery memorandums written in combative Tagalog, Lagman made it clear that the anti-referendum rallies were but dress rehearsals for the Sigwa. He pointed out that the Sigwa was to be unequivocably anti-martial law. Lagman did not state it categorically in his memos, but it was clear that if the opportunity presented itself, Sigwa was to aim at toppling the Marcos government.

In doing so, Lagman was being careful not to displease the CPP national leadership, which was oriented around bringing Marcos down after a lengthy or “protracted” war against the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in the country’s rural areas. This approach was asserted in the recently issued CPP document entitled “Our Urgent Tasks.”

Traditional Opposition

The traditional oppositionists, elements of the Liberal and Nacionalista parties, 1971 Constitutional Convention, and the Civil Liberties Union of the Philippines (CLUP) had not yet reorganized from the disarray caused by the arrests of its members four years earlier. Three of its most prominent personalities were effectively blocked off from public view either by incarceration, as in the case of Ninoy Aquino, or if they were free, by media censorship, as in the case of senators Jose W. Diokno, and Jovito R. Salonga.  

Diokno, Aquino’s companion in Fort Bonifacio until he was released on September 11, 1974, had no organized forces under his command except for a few civil libertarians under the CLUP. He was assisted in this capacity by former constitutional convention delegate and economist Alejandro Lichauco.  In 1975, Diokno and Lichauco wrote a limited circulation pamphlet titled “A Message of Hope for Filipinos Who Care.”

Bold for its time, the pamphlet was an elaboration of the non-communist critique of martial law. It proclaimed, on its cover that it contained “an analysis of three years of martial law, an evaluation of the new society, a projection of the future, and a proposed alternative.” True to the repressive conditions then prevailing, the authorship of the pamphlet was vaguely put as “a representative group of citizens devoted to the cause of truth, justice and freedom.”

I participated in distributing this pamphlet in the University of the Philippines, sometime in 1975. I distinctly remember helping unload packs of the pamplets off senator Diokno’s dark green VW Kombi in front of Vinzons Hall in UP.   

Jovito R. Salonga, still hobbled by the effects of the Plaza Miranda bombing five years earlier, made the rounds of symposiums and seminars sponsored by the National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP), where he assailed the martial law regime. Nonetheless brilliant and eloquent when he spoke, Salonga was often accompanied by anti-Marcos United Church of Christ (UCCP) senior minister Rev. Cirilo A. Rigos.

One such regular gathering was the “Wednesday Forum,” which Rev. Rigos started. It was held alternatively at the Ellinwood Church in Malate, Manila or at the NCCP headquarters along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA).  The forum gave free lunches to those who attended, as an incentive. Suffice it to say that Diokno, who was also a regular in these forums, and Salonga had little mass following. They were heavily reliant on these Left influenced institutions in finding an audience for their anti-martial law denunciations.

The CPP Agenda for the Anti-Referendum-Plebiscite Movement

The demonstrations against the October 16-17 1976 referendum-plebiscite were very important to the CPP and its allies. First, they were meant by the CPP to be venues for the ventilation of what the CPP saw as the people’s real sentiment regarding the referendum-plebiscite. This expression was important since a landslide victory for a “yes” vote was expected, given the rigged nature of the polls.

Second, the mass actions were a show of force for the CPP. They were meant to show the Marcos regime, the CPP allies, and the world that the CPP was the decisive anti-martial law force in the Philippines. The CPP was making it clear that it had the political will and sufficient warm bodies to clog the streets of Manila, albeit for a few hours, in defiance of the severe martial law ban on political demonstrations.

Third, the mass actions were aimed at frustrating Marcos’ attempts to legitimize martial law through a vote of confidence and Marcos’ plan to institute a parliamentary system with him as indefinite prime minister. To achieve this aim, the CPP had sent out a memo to all its sectoral and territorial units to go all out and call for a boycott of the exercise.

A boycott was adjudged the best option for the anti-martial law coalition because, with a Marcos victory all but assured, participation would have given credibility to the results.

The “Ad Hoc Committee” and the “Thursday Group”

The Preparatory Commission for the National Democratic Front (Prepcom NDF) of the CPP put up a seven-person “Ad Hoc Committee” to oversee preparations for the October demonstrations. It was composed of cadres temporarily pulled out from their assignments in the different social “sectors” comprising the CPP urban mass base. Each cadre was responsible for maximizing the attendance of their respective sectors in the rallies. The Ad Hoc Committee was also responsible for organizing symposiums, prayer vigils, masses, and prayer services that would “expose and oppose” the coming referendum-plebiscite and call for a boycott. After the referendum-plebiscite, this committee was commended by Prepcom NDF for a job well done.

The NDF also organized a so-called “Thursday Group” that was composed of civil libertarians, religious leaders, educators, and selected NDF organizers engaged in “united front” or “middle forces work.” It met over dinner and refreshments at St. Scholastica’s College every Thursday evening starting in the first week of September 1976.

The meetings, held over a long and food-laden wooden table, were very cooperative despite the ideological differences. The planning sessions usually lasted up to 11:00 pm. These meetings attested to the drawing power of the Philippine Left at that time, which impressed the non-communist sector because of their persistence, daring, and most of all, organized strength.  

The Thursday Group’s purpose was essentially to keep the civil libertarians well-informed about the anti-referendum movement, enlist their participation as speakers in the rallies, and reassure them on the current strength of the anti-martial law forces. In each meeting, they were given the latest copy of the AMRSP newsletter “Signs of the Times.”

The Thursday Group was composed of Senator Jose W. Diokno, representing the CLU, Senator Jovito Salonga and Rev. Cirilo A. Rigos representing the NCCP and Wednesday Forum, Sr. Mary John Mananzan OSB, the Dean of College of St. Scholastica’s, prominent lawyer and former constitutional convention delegate Teofisto Guingona, Gerry Bulatao representing the AMRSP and the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF), myself, representing NASSA, and the aforementioned NDF persons. 

In one meeting, former Supreme Court associate justice and civil law scholar JBL Reyes attended, representing the CLUP. Others who attended one or two meetings included Fr. Lope Castillo MSC and Fr. Toti Olaguer SJ, representing AMRSP.

In these meetings, I was awed by the presence of these famous people, particularly Diokno and Salonga. I was only 21 years old, and had worshiped them since I started reading newspapers. I remember most vividly one incident in the meeting on September 9, 1976, when Sen. Diokno dramatically announced to the group that Mao Zedong had just died. 
  


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