Assessing the Lame Duck Prospects of President Bongbong Marcos

In democratic systems, a lame duck is typically a political leader who, while still holding office, has lost the authority, public support, or legislative backing necessary for effective governance. 

This status is often associated with the final months of an incumbent's term, particularly following an election loss. However, it can also result from a significant decline in political capital caused by unpopular decisions, broken coalitions, or electoral defeats. 

In the Philippine context, President Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr. could face such a predicament if certain developments arise in 2025. These are:  if his controversial decision to surrender former President Rodrigo Duterte to the International Criminal Court (ICC) causes further popular resentment, and this anger  translates to the defeat of the candidates he has endorsed in the May 12, 2025 midterm elections.

In other words, Marcos Jr. faces a significant risk of becoming a political lame duck during the final three years of his presidency, weakened by diminished influence and limited legislative support. This would leave him increasingly unable to advance key policies or implement meaningful reforms, further undermining his administration’s effectiveness and legacy.

The Duterte imbroglio is essential in this situation. Despite the end of his term some 33 months ago (at the time of this writing), Duterte's popularity has endured, especially in Mindanao and among conservative Filipinos. 

Suffice it to say that Duterte is still a powerful presence in national politics. Millions of Filipinos, especially OFWs, view him as a champion of law and order.

True enough, after Marcos Jr. cooperated with the ICC and handed Duterte over to face charges related to his "War on Drugs," the political fallout was severe. 

Marcos has not only faced backlash from Duterte loyalists but has also been accused of capitulating to Western institutions—an accusation that has historically carried dire political consequences in the Philippines.

Marcos Jr.'s decision has irreparably split the UniTeam coalition. With Duterte loyalists mobilizing against Marcos Jr. and with Rodrigo Duterte's daughter, Vice-President Sara Duterte emerging as the new opposition leader, Marcos Jr. has found himself increasingly isolated.

Midterm elections in the Philippines usually serve as a referendum on the incumbent president. A strong showing by administration-backed candidates indicates healthy public support. Conversely, a poor performance indicates weakening political strength and lends itself to a hostile legislature. 

If Marcos's senatorial slate, grandiosely named "Alyansa para sa Bagong Pilipinas" falls short in the 2025 elections, it would reflect a decline in public confidence. It would also be an ominous handicap on his legislative agenda. A Senate dominated by opposition figures could block bills, delay appointments, and launch investigations.

In this scenario, Marcos Jr., who has yet to demonstrate legacy-defining leadership two years and eight months into his term (at the time of this writing), may find governance more reactive than proactive. He might have no choice but to shift from executive-driven policymaking to a presidency where political survival becomes the top priority.

The term "lame duck" may originate from Western systems, but its dynamics are not new in Philippine political history. Presidents such as Fidel V. Ramos and Benigno C. Aquino III both experienced declining influence in their final years due to unstable allegiances and political problems. Marcos Jr.'s case might be unique due to how quickly this decline might unfold—barely three years into his term.

Furthermore, Philippine politics is deeply clientelistic. Loyalty from legislators and local officials pivots on access to resources. If these trapos perceive a president as weak, the Philippine political elite frequently shift their loyalties. This parasitic political class is pragmatic—loyal when a president serves them, disloyal when a president does not.

The consequences would be troublesome if Marcos becomes a lame-duck president by mid-2025. First, weakened executive leadership could result in political instability. Second, critical political reforms—including the shift to federalism, electoral system improvements, anti-corruption measures, judicial reforms, and legislation against political dynasties—would likely stall, perpetuating existing structural problems.

Finally, both domestic and international actors could exploit the resulting leadership vacuum. Internationally, China might become increasingly assertive in its territorial claims over the West Philippine Sea, sensing a weakened Philippine leadership. Domestically, powerful local political dynasties could capitalize on the situation by further consolidating their autonomy and expanding their influence, potentially undermining national governance.

While Marcos will remain in office until 2028, his capacity to govern may not last as long. The surrender of Duterte to the ICC and a midterm election debacle could rapidly erode his power. Under these circumstances, Marcos would typify a modern political lame duck—still in office but without effective control.

References

International Criminal Court. (n.d.). Philippines and the ICC. Retrieved from https://www.icc-cpi.int/

Rappler. (2023, July 24). Duterte remains most trusted national figure – Pulse Asia. Retrieved from https://www.rappler.com/

The Philippine Star. (2025). Marcos allies face tough battle in 2025 midterm polls. Retrieved from https://www.philstar.com/

ABS-CBN News. (2024). Sara Duterte signals independence from Marcos camp. Retrieved from https://news.abs-cbn.com/

An Implicit Caste System? Unveiling the Philippines' Hierarchical Social Structure

The Philippines, despite its democratic and capitalist appearances, maintains an implicit, undeclared caste system. This system, while not formally recognized as in India, exhibits notable similarities, particularly in terms of social mobility and inherited social status. Historical influences, socio-economic disparities, and racial heritage all contribute to this persistent, regressive, yet often unacknowledged social stratification.

Historically, Philippine society was significantly shaped by pre-colonial caste structures and Indian cultural influences. Maritime trade networks connected the archipelago with Indianized kingdoms such as Srivijaya and Majapahit, spreading Hindu and Buddhist cultural elements that subtly influenced its social undercurrents. Although not adopting the explicit rigidity of India's caste system—characterized by hereditary roles strictly limiting social mobility—the Philippines retains an underlying structure that copies the latter.

These pre-colonial structures became more entrenched during Spanish colonial rule. The Spaniards imposed hierarchical classifications similar to a caste system. Distinct socio-economic roles emerged for Peninsulares (Spaniards born in Spain), Insulares or Creoles (Spaniards born in the colonies), Mestizos de Español (Spanish-Filipino individuals), and Mestizos de Sangley (Filipino-Chinese individuals). 

These categories shaped privileges, opportunities, and life trajectories, significantly shaping social forces and reinforcing long-term inequalities by privileging mestizos over native Austronesians (Indios) or indigenous groups (Negritos) (Corpuz, 1997).

The legacy of these historical stratifications is visible in contemporary Philippine society, particularly among the wealthy elite class. Influential families, such as Zóbel de Ayala, control key economic sectors like finance, real estate, and telecommunications, significantly reinforcing the socio-economic gap. Their concentrated resources perpetuate the implicit caste system by limiting social and economic opportunities for those outside their elite circles (Zóbel de Ayala Family, n.d.).

Economic disparities sharply delineate this elite from the impoverished majority. Poor Filipinos, both rural and urban, remain trapped in cycles of poverty similar to India's Dalit class—the "untouchables".  They face systemic barriers to education, nutrition, and career advancement (Asian Development Bank, 2009).

The similarity of the Philippine poor to the Indian poor extends to the Tagalog language. The Tagalog word "dalita", which means abject poverty, most probably is inspired by the ancient name of India's Dalit class.

Education particularly demonstrates this stratification; those from affluent backgrounds and who are well-educated secure prestigious occupations, while poorer individuals with inferior or little education typically remain confined to low-paying jobs (David & Albert 2015)

Despite entrenched disparities, the Filipino middle class has notably expanded from 28.5% in 1991 to nearly 40% in 2021, indicating increased economic opportunities and potential mobility (Albert, 2024). 

Nevertheless, this emerging middle class remains vulnerable to economic shocks, highlighting the need for sustained economic policies and robust social protections. 

The growth of the Filipino middle class underscores both the resilience and fragility within the implicit caste system, reflecting potential pathways toward greater equity, social integration, and sustained economic stability

Additionally, caste-like distinctions persist between Filipinos of mestizo heritage and those of purely indigenous descent. 

Historically advantaged by better connections and greater opportunities, mestizos continue to benefit from subtle social biases, which influence contemporary social interactions and perceptions (Rodriguez, 2010).

The Chinese Filipino community further complicates this caste landscape. Characterized by economic prominence yet occasional socio-political marginalization, their ambiguous status arises from historical, economic, and geopolitical complexities (Minority Rights Group International, 2021; Frontiers, 2022). 

This ambiguous position stems significantly from historical contexts dating back to the Spanish colonial period. Initially engaged in trade and commerce due to colonial restrictions that barred them from owning land, Chinese Filipinos gradually established influential economic niches, particularly in retail, banking, and manufacturing sectors. 

Over generations, their wealth accumulation led to perceptions of economic dominance, fostering resentment among segments of the Filipino majority and causing periodic tensions. (Chua, R. T. 2021)

Furthermore, geopolitical factors, particularly relations between China and the Philippines, frequently exacerbate their socio-political marginalization. Escalations in territorial disputes in the South China Sea or controversies involving Chinese investment in the Philippines often provoke suspicion or nationalist backlash against Chinese Filipinos. 

Consequently, despite their economic prominence, they periodically experience societal alienation and political scrutiny, highlighting the complex interplay between ethnicity, nationalism, and economics in contemporary Philippine society. (Hau, C. S. 2014)

Similarly, Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), widely celebrated for their economic contributions through remittances, occupy a socially ambiguous space—economically critical yet frequently marginalized socially—highlighting nuanced challenges related to identity, social integration, and equitable recognition within the implicit caste structure (Parreñas, 2001)

In conclusion, the Philippines exhibits a subtle yet complex, implicit caste system deeply rooted in historical, economic, racial, and emerging social dynamics. Recognizing and addressing these underlying divisions is essential for genuinely fostering social mobility, equality, and societal cohesion. 

Policymakers and civil society must prioritize wide-ranging development, equitable access to quality education, and transparent governance to dismantle entrenched social barriers. 

Only through sustained collective effort aimed at comprehensive reform can the Philippines hope to move beyond its implicit caste structures towards a more genuinely equitable and inclusive society.

References

Albert, J. R. G. (2024). The Middle Class in the Philippines: Growing but Vulnerable. ISEAS Perspective.

Asian Development Bank. (2009). Poverty in the Philippines: Causes, Constraints, and Opportunities. Asian Development Bank.

Chua, R. T. (2021). Chinese and Chinese Mestizos of Manila: Family, Identity, and Culture, 1860s-1930s. Brill.

Corpuz, O. D. (1997). An Economic History of the Philippines. University of the Philippines Press.

David, C. C., & Albert, J. R. G. (2015). Recent Trends in Education in the Philippines. Philippine Institute for Development Studies.

Frontiers. (2022). Chinese Filipinos: Perceptions and Contributions. Frontiers in Political Science.

Hau, C. S. (2014). The Chinese Question: Ethnicity, Nation, and Region in and Beyond the Philippines. NUS Press.

Jocano, F. L. (2001). Filipino prehistory: Rediscovering precolonial heritage. Punlad Research House.

Minority Rights Group International. (2021). Chinese – Philippines. Minority Rights Group.

Parreñas, R. S. (2001). Servants of globalization: Women, Migration, and Domestic work. Stanford University Press.

Rodriguez, R. M. (2010). Migrants for export: How the Philippine State Brokers Labor to the World. University of Minnesota Press.

Zóbel de Ayala family. (n.d.). In Wikipedia. Retrieved March 25, 2025, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Z%C3%B3bel_de_Ayala_family

How Rodrigo Duterte Helped Bongbong Marcos Become President

When he was president, Rodrigo Duterte's populist posturing resonated strongly among voters tired of traditional politics. He then positioned himself as the decisive alternative.  His administration was characterized by controversial yet popular moves, allowing him considerable freedom to reshape the country's political dynamics.

Duterte won the Philippine presidency in 2016 by running as a tough-talking populist, vowing to crush crime and illegal drugs. Once in office, he launched a brutal nationwide “war on drugs” that led to thousands of deaths, mostly of poor suspected drug users and not so poor drug pushers. 

Despite international condemnation, Duterte remained enormously popular domestically, reshaping alliances and marginalizing the traditional opposition. 

Bongbong Marcos, who narrowly lost the vice-presidential race to Leni Robredo, contested the results, alleging fraud without conclusive evidence. 

However, Marcos' remained in the public eye, and this enabled him to position himself strategically for future political leverage.

Marcos Jr.'s claims resonated with his supporters, further polarizing public opinion. As mentioned, his consistent presence in the media allowed him to maintain political relevance despite his electoral loss.

On November 18, 2016, Duterte authorized the burial of Ferdinand Marcos Sr. at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, sparking widespread protests due to Marcos Sr.'s human rights abuses and corruption during his dictatorship. This decision symbolically rehabilitated the Marcos legacy, paving the way for the Marcos family's return to higher political prominence.

It must be noted that by 2016, the Marcos family had already established a firm political foothold in the country after being allowed to return in November 1991 by President Corazon Aquino. 

Imelda Marcos had been a congressional representative, Imee Marcos had served as governor of Ilocos Norte, and Bongbong Marcos had completed a term as senator after previously serving as Ilocos Norte governor. These positioned the family for broader political objectives.

The burial was conducted rather privately and discreetly, but it still sparked widespread public protest due to Marcos's controversial legacy as a former dictator associated with human rights abuses and corruption.

Critics argued that the burial diminished the memory of those who suffered under martial law. Supporters, however, viewed it as a necessary step towards national reconciliation. 

Politically, it was the inflection point for the Marcos restoration process as it completed the rehabilitation of the Marcos family brand. 

Social media played a crucial role, amplifying narratives favorable to the Marcoses. The Marcos family leveraged this environment to gain even more public sympathy.

The alliance between Duterte and the Marcoses was strengthened with reciprocal support. 

Duterte’s demonization of opposition figures and disrespect for democratic norms facilitated some historical reassessment that portrayed Marcos Sr.’s dictatorship positively, adding to the Marcos family's political rehabilitation and resurgence.

Imee Marcos’s Senate victory in 2019 marked the family's highest political achievement since their return from exile. This victory signified a clear shift in public acceptance and tolerance towards the Marcoses.

Duterte's overwhelming success in the 2019 midterm elections weakened the opposition, allowing pro-administration and Marcos-aligned figures such as Imee Marcos to enter the Senate. This political landscape provided the Marcoses with substantial institutional leverage.

The complete defeat of 'Otso Diretso' highlighted the electorate’s disenchantment with the Liberal Party (LP) led opposition. This outcome underscored the effectiveness of Duterte’s political strategy. 

The opposition was effectively marginalized, as "Otso Diretso" candidates all failed to win Senate seats.

In 2022, Bongbong Marcos and Sara Duterte-Carpio formed a powerful alliance, running as president and vice president. 

Their campaign effectively utilized Duterte’s popularity, leveraging social media to reshape perceptions of the Marcos regime, culminating in broad electoral appeal. 

Their joint campaign significantly benefitted from the existing Duterte political infrastructure. This partnership effectively unified the supporters of both political dynasties, consolidating their power bases.

The massive scale of their victory indicated strong voter endorsement of Duterte-era policies and style. It also demonstrated the profound impact of coordinated messaging and digital propaganda on electoral outcomes.

Marcos Jr. won the presidency in 2022 by an unprecedented margin (31.6 million votes or 58.77%), signaling the culmination of Duterte’s political realignment efforts. 

Sara Duterte-Carpio also won decisively (32.2 million votes or 61.53%), ensuring the continuity of Duterte’s influence and validating the strategic alliance between the two dynasties.

Marcos Jr.’s presidency represents a dramatic turnaround for a family previously associated with authoritarianism and corruption. This resurgence reflects both Duterte's legacy and a broader global trend toward populist leadership.

Duterte’s presidency profoundly reshaped Philippine politics, facilitating the resurgence of the Marcos dynasty. Through strategic alliance-building, overpowering of the opposition, and shrewd handling of public discourse, Duterte set the conditions that enabled Bongbong Marcos Jr.’s successful return to power, redefining the prevailing political narrative.

Betrayal in The Hague: Marcos Jr.’s ICC Gamble and Its Dire Repercussions

President Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos Jr.’s decision to bring former President Rodrigo Duterte before the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague for alleged crimes against humanity related to his anti-drug campaign has sparked deep outrage and division within the Philippines. This move, rather than serving the cause of justice, undermines the sovereignty of the nation and discredits its judicial system. More importantly, it demonstrates an egregious lack of gratitude and moral responsibility from Marcos Jr., considering Duterte’s pivotal role in the Marcos family's political resurgence.

The Case for the Philippine Justice System

Rodrigo Duterte’s anti-drug campaign was a cornerstone of his administration, and any allegations of human rights abuses should have been addressed by the Philippine courts, not an international tribunal. The nation possesses a functioning and robust judiciary—flawed as it may be, yet fully capable of conducting legal proceedings. By bypassing the Philippine justice system, President Marcos Jr. has essentially declared it untrustworthy, an affront to the courts, justices, judges, lawyers, and legal professionals who work tirelessly within its framework.

The Philippines is not a failed state. Unlike nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the ICC frequently intervenes due to judicial collapse, the Philippine courts remain active and operational. The decision to extradite Duterte sends an insulting message—that the country’s legal institutions are inadequate to handle its own affairs, a notion deeply offensive to the legal community and the broader Filipino public.

Marcos Jr.’s Lack of Gratitude and Political Betrayal

Beyond the judicial implications, this move exposes President Marcos Jr.’s moral bankruptcy. It was Duterte who enabled the Marcos family’s return to political prominence. A defining moment in this process was Duterte’s approval of the reburial of former President Ferdinand Marcos Sr. at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, a move that contributed significantly to the restoration of the Marcos name. To now discard Duterte—an elderly statesman in frail health—by allowing his extradition is nothing short of political betrayal.

Filipino culture places immense value on utang na loob, or debt of gratitude. By disregarding this principle, Marcos Jr. risks alienating not only Duterte’s supporters but also a broader spectrum of Filipinos who see this as an act of disloyalty. The message is clear: political alliances are disposable, and history means nothing.

The Repercussions: A Nation in Disarray

This move has far-reaching consequences beyond Duterte himself. Millions of Filipinos supported his administration because they felt safer under his leadership. The aggressive crackdown on the drug trade reduced crime, providing peace of mind to ordinary citizens and especially, to millions of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) who enjoyed peace of mind, reassured that their families at home enjoyed a more secure environment. 

Duterte’s presidency was not without controversy, but many viewed his campaign as a necessary action against a pressing societal issue.

Now, with Marcos Jr.’s decision, the country is teetering on the edge of Durkheim’s concept of anomie—a state of normlessness and social instability. The outrage, disillusionment, and sense of betrayal felt by Duterte’s millions of supporters could lead to political and social turmoil reminiscent of the pre-EDSA Revolution era. If left unchecked, this unrest could weaken the government’s legitimacy and destabilize the nation.

A Sovereign Nation, or a Puppet of a Largely Ignored Organization?

Perhaps the most alarming aspect of this situation is the manner in which Duterte was sent to the Netherlands. Who furnished the Lear private jet that transported him? Was it arranged by the Philippine government, or was this an operation dictated by foreign influences? The idea that the Philippine National Police (PNP) was mobilized to serve an arrest warrant issued by a foreign court is repugnant to the territorial and inward-looking nature of Filipinos. It suggests that the nation is no longer in control of its own destiny, a humiliation that many Filipinos refuse to accept.

Conclusion

President Marcos Jr.’s decision to send Duterte to the ICC has the makings of  a catastrophic misstep that insults the Philippine justice system, disregards the values of gratitude and loyalty, and risks plunging the country into social instability. It degrades Duterte, a leader who remains beloved by millions, to the status of African dictators who rule over failed states, a category the ICC has traditionally associated with. This is a comparison that is both inaccurate and offensive. Marcos Jr.'s move undermines national sovereignty, disrespects legal institutions, and reeks of political betrayal. 

If history has taught Filipinos anything, it is that political treachery does not go unpunished. Marcos Jr. may soon learn this from the results of the coming May 12 elections, or, like his father, he might learn it the hard way.