Why Dictatorships Breed Violent Power Struggles — And Why Democracies Outlast Them

Dictatorships love the language of order. They speak of stability, unity, discipline—of a nation spared the chaos of elections, dissent, and noisy debate. But beneath this promise of control lies a harsher truth: in authoritarian systems, power is not just authority. It is armor. To lose it is to risk disgrace, exile, prison, or death. Politics, in such regimes, becomes less a contest of ideas than a struggle for survival.

Where democracies offer peaceful exits from office, dictatorships offer none. Leaders do not retire; they are removed. Rivals are not debated; they are neutralized. With no trusted courts, no free press, and no lawful succession rules, political conflict has nowhere to go but into the shadows—into purges, whispers, intelligence wars, and sudden falls from grace. Stability is proclaimed loudly, but fear governs quietly.

Succession, in particular, is the most dangerous hour in authoritarian systems. Who controls the military? Who commands the intelligence services? Who decides which faction lives and which disappears? These are not policy questions—they are survival questions. When the cost of losing power is potentially death or imprisonment, politics naturally becomes ruthless. Violence is not an aberration. It is insurance.

China, modern in economy yet authoritarian in politics, embodies this contradiction. The façade of party unity conceals rival factions, regional interests, military calculations, and elite ambitions. As growth slows and legitimacy is tested, the old bargain of obedience-for-prosperity strains—and elite competition sharpens. What appears solid is often only a temporary truce among competing powers.

And this is where democracies reveal their deepest strength.

If dictatorships are systems built on fear and concentration of power, democracies are built—imperfectly, noisily, but powerfully—on distribution of power. Free elections mean leaders must periodically face the people rather than outmaneuver palace rivals. Term limits remind officials that authority is borrowed, not owned. Multi-party systems ensure that no single group can monopolize truth or power for generations. These mechanisms do not eliminate conflict—but they domesticate it. They turn what could be violent succession struggles into scheduled, predictable, peaceful contests.

Authoritarians often mock free discussion as chaos. They mistake noise for weakness. But open debate, investigative journalism, protest movements, and opposition politics function as pressure valves. Democracies argue loudly in public so they do not fight violently in private. The shouting, the criticism, the messy legislative fights—these are not signs of collapse. They are signs of a system releasing pressure before it explodes.

Due process is another democratic superpower, often invisible until it is gone. When courts are independent and law is predictable, losing political power does not automatically mean losing personal liberty. Opposition leaders can lose elections and live to run again. Business leaders can fall out of favor without disappearing into prisons. Citizens can criticize policy without fearing midnight arrests. When politics is not existential, it becomes less violent. When losing office does not mean losing life, leaders are far more willing to leave office.

By contrast, in tightly controlled one-party or dynastic systems like those in China, Cuba, and North Korea, political competition never disappears—it simply goes underground. Without elections, legitimacy must be manufactured. Without open debate, mistakes compound silently. Without real opposition, leaders are often the last to hear bad news. Loyalty becomes more valuable than competence. Secrecy becomes more valuable than truth. And stability becomes dangerously dependent on the continued strength—or survival—of a single ruling structure.

History offers a brutal pattern. Personalist regimes—from imperial Rome to Stalin’s Soviet Union, from Mao’s China to modern strongman states—rarely end with peaceful retirement speeches. They end in purges, coups, revolutions, or internal collapse. Dictatorships do not eliminate power struggles. They compress them. They bottle them. And when pressure finally escapes, it does so violently.

Democracies, by contrast, survive precisely because they allow correction. They can vote out failures. They can reform bad laws. They can expose corruption publicly instead of settling it through secret factional warfare. They bend constantly—and because they bend, they rarely shatter.

Democracies are slow. They are argumentative. They are messy. They are sometimes exasperating. But history repeatedly shows that systems allowing peaceful replacement of officials tend to outlast systems that depend on power struggles, purges, factional maneuvering, and periodic "cleansing" to change leaders. The ability of democracy to remove power without bloodshed may be one of civilization’s greatest political inventions.

In the end, what passes for stability in authoritarian systems is often just silence before the storm.

Why English Now Sounds Like a Costume in the Philippines: A Note On Language, Power, And Performance

 Introduction: When English Was a Civic Tool

There was a time in this country when speaking English on radio or television did not invite mockery, suspicion, or the reflexive sneer of “paingles-Ingles ka pa.” It invited attention. Not admiration, not resentment—attention. English then functioned not as a costume or class marker, but as a civic tool. It was the language of the courts, the classroom, the newsroom, and the state. Filipinos spoke their local languages fluently and without apology, but when they entered institutional space, they shifted registers as naturally as one puts on shoes before entering a building. That ecology is gone.

What replaced it after EDSA was not merely a new politics but a new tone. And tone, as any broadcaster knows, shapes language faster than policy ever could. The rise of TV Patrol in 1987—with its crusading Filipino, its triumphalist cadences, and the unmistakable populist authority of Noli de Castro’s “Kabayan” persona—marked a cultural border. English did not disappear overnight, but it was dethroned emotionally. Filipino was no longer simply a language; it became a moral claim. English, by contrast, began to sound procedural, technocratic, vaguely suspect.

The shift was understandable, even overdue. A people emerging from a dictatorship wanted news that spoke to them, not at them. Emotion replaced detachment as the primary currency of trust. But something else happened quietly in the background: English ceased to be a shared institutional discipline and became, instead, a symbolic accessory—something one touched briefly to signal seriousness before retreating to safer ground.

Post‑EDSA, a New Tone of Authority

Hence the now-familiar performance on Philippine television: the official, the academic, the media personality who opens with two carefully constructed English sentences—just enough to establish competence—then pivots decisively into Filipino or Taglish.

“Well, first of all, we have to understand the context of the issue. This is really about governance and accountability. Kasi ang problema dito…”

This is not spontaneous code-switching. It is ritual. The English preamble functions like a verbal necktie: worn to signal authority, loosened once credibility has been secured. Two sentences, never more. One sounds tentative; three invite scrutiny. Two is safe.

The Two‑Sentence Necktie

This habit reveals something uncomfortable. English still carries institutional prestige, but it no longer carries social ease. To remain in it too long risks the charge of pretension. To abandon it entirely risks sounding unserious. So speakers hedge. They gesture toward English, then retreat. Authority is invoked, then softened. The result is neither clarity nor elegance, but compromise masquerading as hybridity.

Nowhere is this erosion more visible—or more absurd—than in the growing Filipino habit of replacing the Tagalog “ay” with the English “is”: “Ang gusto kong kainin is lechon.”

This construction is not bilingualism. It is not even Taglish in any meaningful sense. It is grammatical cosplay. The sentence is already complete in Tagalog; the predicate marker "ay" does its job perfectly. Replacing it with "is" adds no clarity, no efficiency, no expressive power. It merely signals aspiration. The word “is” here functions not as a verb, but as a badge.

‘Is’ as Grammatical Cosplay

Older Taglish mixed content, not structure. English nouns, verbs, and concepts entered Filipino sentences because they named things Filipino did not yet easily name: policy, management, technology, and abstraction. What we see now is different. It is the insertion of English particles where Filipino already works—an admission, perhaps unconscious, that speakers no longer fully trust either language to carry authority on its own. This is not linguistic evolution. Evolution produces efficiency. This produces noise.

The tragedy is that none of this was inevitable. Other postcolonial societies—India, Singapore—managed to maintain English as a rigorous institutional language while nurturing local languages without moralizing the choice between them. In the Philippines, we did something more dangerous: we turned language into an ethical statement. Filipino became authentic. English became suspect. Once language is moralized, proficiency withers, because fluency requires comfort, not defensiveness.

And so today we inhabit an odd linguistic middle ground. English survives, but only in fragments—openings, buzzwords, fillers: actually, basically, the thing is. Filipino thrives emotionally, but often at the expense of precision. Taglish becomes the default not because it is superior, but because it is safer. It offends no one, challenges no one, and demands mastery of neither grammar.

From Rigor to Relatability

The result is a public sphere where clarity is rare, confidence is brittle, and sustained thought—whether in English or Filipino—feels increasingly difficult to perform aloud. We did not replace English with Filipino. We replaced discipline with relatability. We replaced rigor with tone.

To point this out is not nostalgia, nor colonial longing, nor elitism. It is a plea for seriousness. A language—any language—cannot survive as a mere prop. It must be trusted to do real work. Until we relearn how to trust both English and Filipino fully, without apology or performance, we will continue speaking in gestures, not sentences, and mistaking noise for voice.

The Day We All Got Our Names: Claveria’s Quiet Revolution

Governor General Narciso Claveria’s 1849 decree giving Filipinos their surnames remains one of the most quietly transformative events in our history—quiet because it involved no battles or revolutions, yet transformative because it reshaped the identity of millions. Before Claveria, most natives used only a single name or a baptismal name, creating confusion in legal records, tax rolls, and church documents.

Entire towns might have dozens of Juan de la Cruzes, with no way to tell families apart. To solve this administrative chaos, Claveria introduced the Catálogo Alfabético de Apellidos, a meticulous, almost obsessive list of tens of thousands of surnames—Spanish, local, Mexican, botanical, geographical, and sometimes whimsically invented. 

Using this catalog, local officials assigned surnames alphabetically by barrio or by whatever system they found convenient, which is why one town might be filled with the Almedas and the Arces, while neighboring barangays house clusters of Bautistas, Cruzes, Dimaculangan, or Policarpio.

What began as a bureaucratic act soon became a cultural imprint. Families long identified by lineage or locality suddenly found themselves bearing surnames that had nothing to do with ancestry, ethnicity, or profession. A farmer in Ilocos could become a “Villanueva,” while a fisherman in Bicol could turn into a “Ramos” or a “Mercado” simply because the local gobernadorcillo read those names aloud that day.

 Some indigenous families kept their native surnames only if they could prove continuous use for at least four generations; many others had theirs replaced entirely. 

This naming overhaul also revealed the colonial obsession with order—Claveria wanted to rationalize taxation, streamline governance, and suppress the mobility of “wandering natives” (his term), but unintentionally he gave Filipinos one of the most enduring markers of identity.

Today, our surnames—whether Spanish-looking like Santos, poetic like Mabini, homegrown like Macapagal, or unique like Dagohoy and Lacson—carry this imprint of colonial administration. They are reminders of a moment when identity was reorganized from above, yet ultimately adopted from below, woven into the stories of families who made these names their own.

 In a country where history often arrives through conquest, rebellion, or catastrophe, Claveria’s surname decree stands out as a quieter but equally powerful force—one that still lives with us every time we sign a document, meet a stranger, trace a family tree, or simply introduce ourselves.

Is It Time To Shed the EDSA Mindset?

Certain events in a nation’s history become more than dates—they become emotional landmarks. For Filipinos, 1986 is not a year. It is a pulse. It lives in our anthem, our textbooks, our slogans, our political speeches. It lives in every protest placard that invokes the words People Power. It lives in the way we still say, with strange confidence, “Pag nagka-problema, kita-kits sa EDSA.”

I was not on EDSA in 1986. Millions weren’t. But we were all shaped by it. Some watched on the news. Others heard the stories. But everyone knew that something spectacular had happened: an entire dictatorship ended without a civil war. Tanks halted because priests stood between the barrel and the crowd. Ordinary citizens—clerks, market vendors, students, nuns—suddenly carried the weight of history. And for one moment, the whole world stood still and saluted us.

It was difficult not to believe after that that we Filipinos were capable of anything. And that is where the complication begins.

The Weight of a Beautiful Memory

How does a nation move forward when its greatest triumph is behind it? How do you build institutions when miracles come more easily to the imagination?

When Marcos fell, the air was filled not only with joy, but with an intoxicating sense of power. If the people brought down one president, they could bring down another. The Constitution was rewritten, institutions were rebuilt, and democracy was declared restored. But something lingered in our political bloodstream: the idea that the ultimate judge is not the Supreme Court, not Congress, not even the ballot box—but the street.

The EDSA Narrative Slowly Transformed into a Political Reflex.

Marcos fell. Estrada followed. Arroyo endured marches, siege attempts, and the constant threat of collapse. Today, whispers gather around President Bongbong Marcos. As accusations rise, familiar slogans reappear. Old rally grounds stir like muscle memory. It is as if the nation keeps a pair of marching shoes — always polished, never fully stored away. History, it seems, does not only echo—it rehearses.

But with every return to EDSA, a quiet question grows louder, more insistent: Are we honoring our history—or are we trapped by it? Have we preserved the spirit of People Power, or have we preserved only the choreography? Do we rally because the moment demands it—or because we have forgotten any other way to respond to crisis? What began as a cry for democratic rebirth may now be turning into a political shortcut, a ritual performed whenever institutions move too slowly, or justice seems too distant. 

And if we cannot imagine change without a crowd on the highway, then perhaps the triumph of 1986 has become our cage—a victory so luminous that it now blocks our view of a different future.

The Subtle Cost of Revolutions

The problem with miracles is that they age badly. The first time, they are riveting. The second time, they are déjà vu. The third time, they are routine. And revolutions, when repeated, slowly become hollow theater—stripped of moral complexity, reduced only to spectacle.

Our institutions—meant to grow stronger after 1986—have instead grown timid in its shadow. Impeachment is no longer respected. Courts are distrusted. The legislature becomes hesitant. The Ombudsman issues findings but few consequences. Political parties are built around personalities, not principles.

Why? Because many Filipinos quietly believe that all of these institutions are merely the prelude to something “real”: another uprising, another confrontation, another surge of bodies on the asphalt of EDSA.

It is as though the nation matured only halfway. We learned how to revolt—but not how to govern. We learned how to protest—but not how to prosecute. We learned how to topple presidents—but not how to hold them to account. And now the price has become due.

The Current Crossroads

Criticism against the current administration is growing. Accusations of corruption and betrayal are surfacing again. This alone is not new. Democratic societies must learn how to criticize their leaders. But here lies the danger: every time political pressure mounts, some Filipinos instinctively reach for the shortcut. “EDSA na lang ulit.” “Tanggalin na lang.” “March tayo.” "BBM and Sara Resign."

We forget that EDSA succeeded only because the system had collapsed. Today, the system exists. Impeachment exists. Investigative journalism exists. Congressional hearings exist. Judicial review exists. Our challenge is not to bypass these institutions—but to force them to work. That is the moral difference between a rebellion and a Republic. A Republic stands not on anger, but on institutions built to survive it. 

The Future We Owe EDSA

The greatest irony is that to honor EDSA is not to repeat it—but to render it unnecessary. People Power was never meant to be a permanent option. It was a bridge: a transitional moment meant to lead us away from emergency politics and toward constitutional maturity. If we must use it every generation, then we have not evolved—we have looped back on ourselves.

Perhaps the real tribute to EDSA is this: That one day, no Filipino child will need to march to restore justice. That one day, corruption will be punished not by rallies—but by verdicts. That one day, presidents will fear not crowds—but the law. When that day comes—when change happens inside the system, not outside of it— then EDSA will not be abandoned. It will, at last, be fulfilled. And the crowd will not need to return to the streets. Because the Republic will finally stand on its own feet.

 

THE INNER FIRE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ACTIVISM AND THE FILIPINO SEARCH FOR CHANGE

Activism is often described in political colors — left, right, progressive, conservative, populist, or radical. But beneath ideologies lies a quieter phenomenon: the human psychology that powers action. What drives a person to stand under the sun for hours, to speak when it is easier to stay silent, to risk social pressure, fatigue, or isolation? The answer is not purely ideological — it is existential. Activism begins when an individual senses that life must amount to more than routine survival. It is a search for purpose, a refusal to waste one’s brief time in silence.

At its core, activism is meaning-seeking. Austrian psychiatrist and Holocaust survivor Viktor Frankl once wrote that man can endure almost anything — as long as he finds meaning in it. Activists appear irrational to observers: why protest when nothing seems to change? Why argue when power is deaf? Yet, from a psychological lens, this “irrational persistence” is precisely what gives life coherence. Activism answers a deep human fear — that our days might pass without leaving any trace. The impulse to act is often more existential than political: I must live a life that matters.

But meaning alone does not move crowds. Beneath many activist movements lies empathic anger — a fusion of compassion and moral outrage. It is the kind of empathy that cannot sit still. When injustice is normalized, the activist feels psychological dissonance — a discomfort between belief and inaction. Action then becomes not only political, but therapeutic: it restores alignment between values and behavior. Whether through marches, petitions, or community work, activism gives people a sense of agency — the belief that one is not entirely powerless.

Finally, activism forms identity. Movements provide what modern life rarely gives: solidarity. The individual is absorbed into a larger “we.” This collective identity lowers fear, boosts hope, and fuels endurance. Humanity has seen this across history — from anti-slavery campaigns in the 19th century, to the Suffragettes, to the civil rights struggles of the 1960s. Every era has its thunder. But the inner psychology remains constant: a person acts not only for society — but to answer the question, Who am I really?

Filipino activism has always been shaped by this psychological foundation — but with uniquely local tones. Our history forged a people who protest for survival, not ideology. The Propaganda Movement was triggered not by political theory, but by the pain of human dignity denied. The Katipunan was not a philosophical school — it was a cry from the gut. Even the First Quarter Storm, EDSA I, EDSA II — each began not with manifestos, but with exhaustion. When ordinary life becomes unbearable, activism emerges as a last language.

Filipino activism has evolved into two distinct forms: street activism and quiet activism. The former dominates headlines — rallies, slogans, speeches, and slogans rehearsed for cameras. But beneath this loud surface lies a gentler, often unreported current: barangay health missions, youth tutoring networks, community farming, disaster mapping, neighborhood chats about drainage, small groups collecting research on procurement anomalies, students fact-checking claims instead of chanting slogans. This is not the activism of symbols — it is the activism of solutions. It is less theatrical, but more sustainable.

Filipino activism suffers today from three psychological wounds. First is protest fatigue — the fear that nothing changes anyway. Second is political capture — when movements are weaponized by elite factions, activism slowly becomes performance. Third is identity confusion — many Filipinos want to help their country but do not wish to be labeled or dragged into ideological wars. They ask: Is there space for activism without being used?

But there is another side to our story. The Filipino activist is not disappearing — it is mutating. It is moving away from spectacle, towards strategy. It is leaving the stage and entering classrooms, spreadsheets, local ordinances, online fact-checking, and quiet data gathering. It refuses to merely shout. It wishes to build. It is still moral outrage — but it is now escorted by competence.

The psychology of activism in the Philippines is therefore not the psychology of rebellion — but the psychology of rebuilding. It is not always loud, and rarely perfect. But it continues — stubbornly, quietly — in school projects, disaster-preparedness workshops, NGO internships, local campaigns against child abuse, anti-plastic drives, mental health support groups, town hall dialogues, and youth councils that record budget flows. These may not fill the streets — but they are beginning to fill the gaps where government often fails.

Activism is not sustained by anger alone. That burns out quickly. The deeper fuel is hope with discipline—the belief that solutions exist and that ordinary citizens can build them. The Filipino activist of today might speak less, but study more. March less, but design more. He may not display a placard — but he might already be writing a policy draft, mapping a drainage system, or starting a local database of ghost projects.

Boy Abunda: The Host Who Became the Show

In Philippine television, the talk show is meant to be a venue for revelation—for the gradual unfolding of a guest’s personality through thoughtful questioning. Yet with Boy Abunda, this traditional framework is often reversed. The spotlight does not wait for the guest—it gravitates instantly toward the host. What should be a shared stage becomes a showcase of presence, and what should be an interview often turns into a stylized performance—with the guest positioned merely as a responding figure within the orbit of Boy Abunda.

Dominance of Presence — When Style Becomes Centerpiece

Abunda’s hosting approach rarely leaves room for silence or subtlety. His loud voice, sweeping gestures, theatrical pauses, and flamboyant attire do not simply color the conversation—they define it. Instead of generating space where the guest may speak naturally, he becomes the gravitational center of the moment. The spotlight expands around him first, leaving the guest to adjust to the temperature of his presence. The result is the “host-as-star” phenomenon: a talk show that serves less as a platform for others and more as a canvas for his personality.

The “Nay, Tay” Problem—Intimacy or Distraction?

A key example of this tendency is his constant invocation of his parents—“Nay,” “Tay”—regardless of the guest or the tone of the conversation. While perhaps meant to be humanizing, these repeated references often have the opposite effect: they interrupt the rhythm, shift the focus, and add a layer of emotional framing that many viewers neither need nor seek. The average viewer is not tuned in to hear about him—they tuned in expecting to hear from the guest. 

But instead, the recurring “Nay, Tay” narrative becomes an unnecessary burden on the viewer, as though we must carry the memory of his parents throughout every conversation—whether it fits or not. It becomes a kind of forced intimacy that distracts rather than deepens the exchange. For some, it even feels like another way of re-centering the host, as if loud mannerisms were not enough—now we are asked to bear personal history as well.

Performance Over Conversation

In classical interviewing, the host disappears—facilitating insight through quiet listening and carefully shaped questions. Abunda, however, approaches interviewing as performance. His phrasing is dramatic, his movements staged, his emotional pivots calculated. What begins as conversation often turns into choreography. The guest must essentially follow his rhythm. Presence becomes performance, sincerity becomes secondary, and the question is not “What truth did we discover?” but “How did Boy Abunda present it?”

The Cultural Shift

This has broader implications. When interviewing becomes performance, the search for truth gives way to the display of personality. The Filipino interview format shifts—not toward the story of the guest, but toward the narrative of the host. What could have been a moment of revelation becomes an exhibition of posture. The hierarchy of voices changes: the guest may enter the studio—but it is the host who occupies it.

The Illustrative Interview

In many interviews, the emotional tone is set even before the guest speaks. The gestures, the vocal texture, the solemn framing—these arrive before any real exchange begins. Suddenly, it is not a dialogue but a directed scene. The host conducts the music, and the guest must sing accordingly. We remember less of what was said, and more of how Boy Abunda reacted to it.

One Final Observation

Ultimately, Abunda shows us that a talk show today is not merely a conversation—it is a struggle for presence. His repeated “Nay, Tay, Kapuso” invocations may mean much to him personally, but for many viewers, they feel like yet another means of spotlighting himself rather than illuminating the guest. Whether one sees this as flair or self-centricity, one truth emerges: in a media culture that rewards spectacle, it is not always the guest who enters the room—but the host who never leaves it.

Beyond the Noise: The Quiet Progress of a Nation

In recent months, public discourse in the Philippines has been consumed by one issue—the flood control scandal. Opinion columns thunder with outrage, social media magnifies anger by the second, and headlines often suggest that the country is spiraling into dysfunction. 

Yet outside the echo chamber of political rhetoric and the often sensationalized media cycle, a quieter reality persists—one marked not by collapse, but by resilience, reform, and unmistakable signs of progress. To mistake noise for truth is to overlook the many forward-moving sectors that continue to strengthen the country’s foundations.

Across the Philippine economy, investment indicators tell a story different from the nightly news. Business process outsourcing (BPO) remains robust, employing over 1.5 million Filipinos and expanding into higher-value services such as health analytics, engineering design, cybersecurity, and AI-assisted workflows. Manufacturing, particularly in electronics and automotive parts, has been gaining momentum as supply chains slowly shift away from China. 

The country is now among Southeast Asia’s top exporters of semiconductors, and major tech firms have signaled plans to expand operations in Central Luzon and CALABARZON. Meanwhile, agriculture—long viewed as the nation’s weakest link—is finally receiving overdue attention, with irrigation projects, rice genome research, and digital farm-to-market platforms beginning to reach farmers beyond urban centers.

In the infrastructure sector, while controversies attract national attention, thousands of other projects proceed steadily: road widening in provincial corridors, the rollout of renewable microgrids in island communities, airport expansions from Bicol to Cagayan, and the rehabilitation of long-neglected seaports. 

The railway revival, once a historical footnote, is becoming tangible—the North-South Commuter Railway is advancing, the Cebu Monorail is scheduled for groundbreaking, and feasibility talks for a Mindanao railway are being reactivated. These developments may lack the drama of scandal—but they represent the slow, necessary steps toward a genuinely modern nation.

There are also encouraging developments in governance and civic participation. The adoption of e-governance systems has accelerated since 2022—more local governments are now digitizing business permits, civil registry services, and tax payments. The Commission on Audit has introduced AI-assisted auditing models that help identify suspicious patterns in procurement. 

More importantly, citizens are learning to monitor government performance themselves—civil society groups are tracking infrastructure budgets, student organizations are analyzing climate data, and volunteer lawyers have expanded legal clinics across disaster-prone municipalities. Public scrutiny, once limited to urban intellectual circles, is becoming decentralized and participatory.

Education and culture—a country’s long-term engine—are also showing signs of renewal. The number of Filipinos in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) fields has increased, and scholarship links with Japan, South Korea, and the United States have quietly multiplied. Philippine universities are beginning to integrate AI tools into teaching and research. Heritage conservation is experiencing a renaissance: Intramuros is being digitized for interactive history apps, several provincial museums are being restored, and Filipino artists are gaining global recognition in digital and architectural design—fields once dominated abroad. 

Even in sports, the average Filipino athlete receives far better science-based training today than a decade ago, and the success of Filipino chess prodigies and Olympic hopefuls signals a rising generation shaped less by luck and more by systems.

Above all, Filipino resilience today is not of the passive kind. It is not simply “weathering the storm.” It is an active resilience—a search for solutions instead of a tolerance of pain. Barangay-level disaster mapping, youth-led climate initiatives, volunteer-based tutoring networks, overseas mentorships, cooperative farming—a quiet network of progress is weaving itself underneath the loud narrative of decay. 

The real story of the Philippines is not told solely in Senate hearings or viral posts. It is told in classrooms, export zones, research labs, municipal halls, and community gardens.

The flood-control scandal must be investigated. Accountability must be pursued. But outrage must not blind the nation to its own endurance. The Philippines is not defined solely by what is wrong—it is also defined by those who steadily build what is right. History records not only the failures of governments—but the perseverance of citizens who never abandoned the long work of nationhood.

The noise may grow louder in the coming months. But beyond it lies a Philippines that is quietly learning, building, adapting. And that quiet work—though unsung—is the true foundation of the future.

The Flood That Never Recedes

When Typhoons Tino and Uwan battered the Philippines in November 2025, they exposed more than swollen rivers and shattered dikes. They revealed a deeper and deadlier reality: in this country, the flood often begins not with rain, but with corruption. From 2022 to 2025, the government allotted ₱545 billion for flood control. Yet audits and Senate inquiries suggest that ghost projects, substandard construction, and contractor monopolies may have bled the economy of up to ₱118 billion. Some experts estimate that in certain projects, only 40% of the funds reach actual implementation—the rest disappears into a maze of kickbacks and political favors.

This scandal is not an accident. It is a system. Fifteen favored contractors cornered about ₱100 billion, roughly a fifth of all flood-control spending since 2022. These projects are technically complex, difficult to monitor, and perfect for quiet profit. The pork barrel was abolished in name—but survives in practice. Flood control has become the new political currency.

That is why the 2025 flood control scandal cannot be treated as a simple “abuse of funds.” In a country battered by 20 typhoons a year, the absence of flood protection is not mere inefficiency. It is slow, systemic violence—one that falls hardest on the poor, the riverside settlers, the jeepney drivers, and the farmers waiting for relief goods beside muddy roads.

The scandal also exploded at the worst political moment: amid the deepening split between President Marcos and the Duterte camp. Each side now exposes the other’s budget allocations with surgical precision—and both are correct. Allocations in Davao are questioned; allocations in Romualdez districts are likewise flagged. Where political alliances once protected projects, political feuds now expose them. But this “expose war” brings no reform—only paralysis. When everyone has something to hide, no one dares to clean house.

Public anger has surged. The November 2025 rally gathered an estimated 650,000 Filipinos—one of the largest public demonstrations in decades. They came from parishes, jeepney terminals, evacuation zones, and student dormitories. But the presence of well-organized bloc-voting groups—particularly Iglesia ni Cristo—added an ambiguous note. Was this the birth of a real movement for reform—or merely the rehearsal of another election war?

The administration responded with familiar moves: it cancelled ₱252 billion in 2026 flood-control projects, formed a commission, and promised accountability “before Christmas.” But history warns us to be cautious. The Philippines has seen this play before: PDAF, the Fertilizer Fund, Pharmally. Money vanishes. Public outrage rises. A few names are prosecuted. The system resets—and waits for the next budget cycle. In this structure, corruption is not aberration; it is strategy.

But there is a deeper danger now—scandal fatigue. As corruption becomes routine, outrage becomes brief. Our worst political illness is not plunder—it is exhaustion. If we accept that corruption is inevitable, we must also accept that death by flood is inevitable. Climate change will not wait. The next typhoon season will test not only our infrastructure—but our democracy’s pulse.

There is a boundary that must not be crossed: When the public stops caring, accountability vanishes. When accountability vanishes, disaster response becomes mere performance. When performance replaces governance—floods do not come from the sky; they originate from the system itself.

The waters from the 2025 typhoon have receded. But the real flood—the one running through our institutions—has not. It erodes the riverbanks of democracy, quietly and steadily, year after year. If we allow it to flow unchecked, there may come a day when disaster strikes—and we find that our democracy, too, has quietly drowned.

The question is not whether the next storms will come. They will.

The deeper question is: Will we have built defenses— or only better excuses?

Patronage Politics: How the Budget Betrays the People

In a recent interview with Cathy Yang on Thought Leaders, PHINMA (Philippine Investment Management) CEO Ramon del Rosario Jr. delivered a rare moment of clarity on the enduring problems of governance and fiscal accountability in the Philippines. His remarks, prompted by the controversy surrounding flood-control funds, exposed not only the inefficiencies of public spending but also the deeper moral lapses that continue to erode public trust.

Del Rosario described as “strange” the President’s public rebuke of corrupt officials—“Mahiya naman kayo!”—given that, as he noted, “It was his budget to start with.” The observation underscored a critical contradiction: how can a leader disown a spending plan that his own office designed, endorsed, and pushed through Congress? This irony lies at the heart of the ongoing flood-control scandal, which has been plagued by allegations of overpriced or nonexistent projects.

More than an indictment of administrative failure, Del Rosario’s statement was a broader warning about how the national budget has devolved into a tool of patronage—a means of rewarding political allies rather than serving citizens. In a country where public works have long been treated as political currency, this critique resonates deeply. 

The national budget, Del Rosario implied, is not merely an accounting instrument but a moral document. It reveals what the government values and whom it chooses to protect. When flood-control funds vanish while communities remain submerged, the figures tell a story of misplaced priorities and moral neglect.

Equally significant was Del Rosario’s emphasis on accountability. Once public funds are approved and released, officials often seek to evade responsibility. Yet leadership, he argued, demands ownership of the entire process—from proposal to implementation. Governance is not about pointing fingers; it is about stewardship and moral consistency.

Del Rosario’s prescriptions were neither radical nor utopian. They were grounded in common sense and sound governance: transparency by default, accountability at the top, and adherence to scientific principles rather than political convenience. 

Effective flood control, he reminded, is not about pouring concrete indiscriminately but about managing water intelligently—through reforestation, disciplined zoning, adequate drainage, and long-term planning. Public funds should follow the science, not the politics.

What distinguishes Del Rosario’s intervention is its tone of civic decency and constructive criticism. He did not indulge in moral grandstanding or partisan rhetoric. Instead, he articulated a vision of governance anchored in responsibility and foresight—qualities that have become increasingly scarce in public discourse. His reminder that “It was his budget to start with” stands out as a quiet act of courage amid the noise and deflection that dominate the national conversation.

If taken seriously, Del Rosario’s message could reshape public expectations about governance. Each line in the national budget would be viewed not as a favor to be distributed, but as a promise to be fulfilled. Infrastructure projects—bridges, dikes, and canals—would once again serve the public interest rather than private gain. 

In essence, budgets can either purchase public trust or subsidize private greed. Del Rosario’s appeal was for the former: that the nation’s finances be guided by moral integrity, transparency, and science-based policymaking.

Such clarity of thought and principle is a reminder that effective governance begins with the courage to accept responsibility. In a time when public confidence is waning, Del Rosario’s words reaffirm that good sense and moral stewardship still have a rightful place in the national dialogue.

The Lame Duck in Malacañang

It is still three long years before Filipinos again troop to the polls in May 2028, yet President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. already bears the air of a lame duck. In politics, perception is everything—and the prevailing one is that of a leader adrift, besieged by scandals, deserted by allies, and unsure how to steady the ship of state amid gathering storms.

A Presidency Losing Its Pulse

The anti-corruption rallies growing in number across the country have become a barometer of public frustration. Once dismissed as scattered dissent, they now reflect a more dangerous undercurrent: a citizenry rediscovering its voice. Each protest that fills the streets is a reminder that the promise of “unity” has collapsed into paralysis. Even the once-pliant bureaucracy senses the drift—projects stall, appointments freeze, and the Cabinet seems to function on autopilot.

The justice system, meanwhile, moves at its characteristic glacial pace. The investigations into alleged corruption in infrastructure funds, procurement anomalies, and favoritism within agencies lumber along—too slow to satisfy the public’s hunger for accountability, yet too visible to be ignored. This half-light of uncertainty—where wrongdoing is suspected but unpunished—is the worst possible environment for governance.

Perilous Vacuum of Power

In any democracy, a president who can no longer command confidence becomes more than ineffectual; he becomes a risk factor. When the chief executive is perceived as weak, the entire institutional architecture begins to creak. Opportunists smell blood. Ambitious politicians start positioning themselves for the next election cycle. Even within the armed forces, whispers of “restoring order” can find sympathetic ears among adventurists nostalgic for “discipline.”

The Philippines has walked this knife’s edge before. A vacuum at the top tempts those in uniform who believe, wrongly, that national salvation lies in barracks rather than ballots. The longer this administration drifts, the greater the temptation for rash acts that could imperil democratic continuity.

Governance Under Siege

To expect Bongbong Marcos to govern effectively under these conditions is to expect the impossible. His legitimacy has been eroded not only by scandal but by inertia. The break with Vice President Sara Duterte fractured his coalition beyond repair; the Senate and House are now battlefields of shifting loyalties. Even within his own family and inner circle, fractures are whispered about.

No president can lead when his every directive is second-guessed, when his Cabinet fears the next exposé, and when the streets echo with calls for resignation. The “baggages” of political indebtedness, historical denialism, and administrative indecision have finally caught up with him.

The Democratic Cost of Drift

An ineffectual president for the next three years is dangerous not just for the Palace but for the Republic. The business climate suffers when uncertainty reigns. The bureaucracy stagnates. Populist demagogues thrive on public disgust. And reformist energy—so vital in moments of national disillusionment—gets wasted on survival rather than reconstruction.

The tragedy is not merely that Marcos Jr. may limp to the end of his term, but that in doing so, he could drag down faith in democratic governance itself. When citizens conclude that elections only yield mediocrity, they start looking elsewhere for saviors.

Where the Country Stands

There is still time—barely—for the president to act with statesmanship: to accept accountability, to enable institutional reforms, even to step aside if his continued stay becomes untenable. A dignified exit is better than a drawn-out implosion. But the hour is late, and the writing is already on the wall.

The real question now is not whether Bongbong Marcos can recover his authority, but whether Philippine democracy can survive his decline intact. The nation cannot afford three years of drift, indecision, and distraction. It needs moral energy, not merely political endurance.

A lame duck can still quack—but it cannot lead a flight.

Budget Insertions and Moral Erosion: The Hidden Pandemic in Congress

 A Virus Without Symptoms

The pandemic may have ended, but another contagion lingers—one that infects not the lungs but the nation’s moral bloodstream. It spreads quietly in committee rooms and late-night bicameral meetings, transmitted not by coughs but by signatures. Its name is budget insertion—a mutation of corruption that hides beneath the language of “allocations,” “amendments,” and “local development funds.”

Each year, as the national budget thickens to thousands of pages, the virus multiplies. Billions of pesos appear almost by magic—inserted after hearings are done, after scrutiny fades, after public attention has shifted to Christmas or celebrity gossip. The result is a ledger swollen not by the people’s needs but by political greed.

The Anatomy of an Insertion

On paper, a “budget insertion” sounds technical, even harmless. Legislators, after all, must represent their districts. Who could object to a road here, a health center there, a flood control project somewhere in the lowlands? But the danger lies not in what is visible—but in what is hidden.

An insertion is a post-approval addition—a fund smuggled into the budget after the President’s proposal has been debated. It is not a crime by definition, but it is a crime against transparency. In essence, it transforms the national budget from a policy document into a political buffet.

It is, in truth, the same pork with a different flavor. The Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) was once its name. When public outrage boiled over in 2013, the Supreme Court struck it down. But like all resilient viruses, pork reinvented itself—now coded as “insertions,” “amendments,” or “agency requests.” The nomenclature changes; the appetite remains.

When Morality Is Amended

The real casualty is not merely fiscal discipline but moral order. When billions can be quietly re-channeled with no one accountable, the entire architecture of governance begins to rot.

Budget insertions erode three pillars of a republic:

• Trust. Citizens lose faith not only in their lawmakers but in democracy itself. Each scandal confirms the suspicion that the government is a syndicate in Barong Tagalog.

• Meritocracy. Public works are no longer based on need or efficiency but on political kinship. The flood control project that worsens flooding is not an accident—it is the logical outcome of corruption by design.

• Accountability. Oversight hearings become theatre; inquiries are launched to distract, not to discipline.

When every peso becomes negotiable, principles become expendable.

The Culture of Silence

Why, then, is there so little outrage? Perhaps because the infection is bipartisan. Both administration and opposition dip their hands into the same pot. They merely quarrel over who gets the larger ladle.

Inside the bureaucracy, the disease has become routine. Career officials, once wary, now shrug: “Ganyan talaga.” To protest is to risk one’s post; to comply is to survive. Even the citizenry, worn down by scandal fatigue, has developed moral calluses. Wala namang malinis.

Ten years ago, people marched against pork. Today, they scroll past it. Outrage has become vintage. We have normalized what once enraged us. I hope I'm wrong.

The Illusion of Development

Every insertion has a story—a school building that never opened, a road that leads nowhere, a seawall that collapses in the first storm. Yet all are wrapped in the rhetoric of “progress.”

It is a cruel irony that while the government borrows billions for “nation-building,” much of it builds only private fortunes. A congressman’s name engraved on a waiting shed has become the new cathedral of gratitude.

The tragedy lies not in the waste alone but in the deception. These insertions steal not just money but meaning. They turn public service into patronage, governance into gossip, citizenship into spectatorship.

Rebuilding the Immune System

What can cure a moral epidemic? Not another sermon, but structural reform.

1. Full Disclosure. Every amendment after the bicameral conference must be published line by line, with sponsoring legislators named.

2. Independent Citizen Audits. Civil society and universities should partner with the Commission on Audit (COA) to review local projects funded by insertions.

3. Digital Transparency. A public portal tracking funds from proposal to completion—allowing citizens to see where their taxes truly go.

4. Ban on Midnight Insertions. No new items allowed once the bicameral conference closes. Sunlight, after all, is still the best disinfectant.

But reform will mean little if morality itself remains compromised. Laws can close loopholes; only conscience can close temptation.

Lessons from the Floods

Perhaps nothing symbolizes our predicament more than the yearly floods that drown our cities. Billions are spent on “flood control,” yet the waters keep rising. Why? Because the funds are controlled by politicians, not by engineers.

In 1986, the Filipino people rose against electoral fraud. Today, it may be budget fraud that drowns us. The floodwaters outside our homes are reflections of the corruption inside our institutions.

When Congress treats the national budget as personal property, the nation becomes one big calamity area—declared, redeclared, and never recovered.

The Real Pandemic

A nation can survive calamities, coups, and even dictatorships. What it cannot survive is the slow death of moral immunity. For when wrongdoing becomes routine and silence becomes consent, the republic’s soul begins to decay.

The real pandemic is not viral—it is moral. Its first carrier is greed; its final symptom is apathy. And until Congress cleanses itself of this hidden infection, every budget will be a patient in critical condition.

For in the end, no vaccine can cure a conscience that no longer feels sick.

Snap Elections as Reset, Justice as Reckoning

Introduction

When corruption scandals reach a tipping point, citizens naturally search for a way out. Today, with the flood control controversy eroding public trust in government, the proposal for a snap election has resurfaced. Yet critics quickly retort: “Ano ang silbi ng snap election kung ang mahalal ulit ay pare-parehong kurakot? Dapat kayong mga nasa pwesto ang magbago.”

At first glance, that objection seems sensible. Why hold another election if the outcome is the same cycle of plunder? But this line of reasoning traps us in a classic chicken-and-egg dilemma: we need honest officials to fix a corrupt system, but we need a reformed system to elect honest officials. If we wait for politicians to change on their own, we wait forever. If we wait for voters to become perfectly discerning, we wait in vain.

The Constitutional Question

Here lies the complication: unlike in 1986, when Ferdinand Marcos Sr. called a snap election under the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution no longer provides for such a mechanism. The president has a fixed six-year term, with no reelection, and there is no explicit provision for dissolving government and calling an early presidential election.

So, how can a snap election be done legally today? Only through extraordinary political and constitutional means:

Amendment or Revision of the Constitution – Congress, sitting as a Constituent Assembly or through a Constitutional Convention, may insert a provision enabling a special election. This is the “textbook” legal path, but it is slow and uncertain.

Congressional Action for Early Elections – Congress has authority to set the date of elections (Article VI, Sec. 8 for special legislative polls). Extending this principle to the presidency would be controversial but could be attempted if backed by broad consensus.

Resignation + Special Election – If a president resigns, the vice president succeeds. The only way to “return the choice to the people” is if both positions are vacated (by resignation, removal, or political settlement) and Congress calls a special election to fill the vacancies.

Extra-Constitutional but Political – As 1986 showed, if the sitting president himself calls for an election outside the Constitution, it can still gain legitimacy if accepted by the opposition and by the people. The danger is that legality is weak, but legitimacy may carry it through.

In other words, today’s Constitution locks the doors against a snap election. But as history has shown, when institutions are paralyzed by corruption, political will and public demand sometimes pry those doors open. The legal hurdles are formidable, but political crises have a way of bending rigid structures. What seems unconstitutional on paper may become unavoidable in practice when legitimacy collapses.

Elections as Reset Button, Not Magic Wand

A snap election is not a cure-all. It will not automatically cleanse politics of greed. But it acts as a reset button—a way for citizens to withdraw their mandate from discredited leaders and reassert accountability. Without such a mechanism, those in power only grow bolder, thinking the public is powerless to respond.

The 1986 snap election offers a lesson. It was marred by fraud, but it triggered a massive people’s movement that forced the world’s spotlight on Philippine democracy. The perception of massive cheating became the spark that ignited EDSA. That imperfect election, far from being useless, became the turning point for regime change. Even flawed elections can open doors when citizens seize the moment.

But while elections can reset political legitimacy, they cannot by themselves dismantle entrenched systems of corruption. That requires justice.

Justice Must Walk Side by Side With Snap Elections

Still, elections alone are not enough. To restore credibility, a snap election today must be accompanied by honest-to-goodness prosecution of those implicated in the current scandal. Politics and justice must move together: one withdraws the people’s mandate, the other ensures criminal liability.

Post-EDSA, the call was not just for new leadership but also for accountability. Marcos cronies faced charges in the Sandiganbayan; the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was created to recover ill-gotten wealth. While results were uneven, these efforts showed that regime change and prosecution had to go hand in hand.

If elections proceed without prosecutions, the whole exercise risks being dismissed as a political spectacle. Conversely, if prosecutions are pursued without elections, the same tainted leadership still clings to power. It is their combination that sends the strongest message—that corruption has consequences, both at the ballot box and in the courts.

This dual approach also tempers cynicism. People are less likely to dismiss a snap election as “useless” if they see corrupt officials facing genuine legal consequences. Justice gives substance to the reset.

How to Break the Loop

The comment that “politicians should simply change their ways” appeals to conscience. But conscience is unreliable when unchecked by institutions. What history teaches us is clear: politicians rarely change unless forced to—by pressure from citizens, by the threat of losing office, and by the certainty of legal accountability.

Breaking the chicken-and-egg cycle of corruption requires more than just elections and prosecutions. It also demands structural and cultural change:

• Institutional Reforms First (System Overhaul) – Strengthen checks such as COMELEC independence, campaign finance rules, party reforms, and transparency. Even if politicians are tempted, the system makes corruption harder. This way, elections are more meaningful.

• Incremental Cultural Change – Waiting for a “totally honest” electorate is unrealistic. But small steps—public education, anti-dynasty awareness, watchdog groups—can slowly tilt voter behavior.

• Trigger Events (Catalysts) – Crises like the flood control scandals can shake the status quo and create public demand for cleaner leadership. These are opportunities for movements or coalitions to push honest candidates forward.

• Parallel Track – It doesn’t have to be sequential (“system first, then leaders” or “leaders first, then system”). Often both evolve together. You elect a few reformists, they push small changes, which then allow more reformists to rise in the next cycle.

Reform, therefore, is not a single event but a process of pushing in many directions at once. Elections may provide the spark, prosecutions the substance, and reforms the structure that ensures gains are not rolled back.

A Call to Citizens

We must not fall into fatalism—the idea that “lahat naman kurakot” so why bother? Every crisis opens a window. Every scandal is also an opportunity to push the line of accountability further. The task of citizens is to demand both political reset and judicial reckoning. One without the other is incomplete; together they form the path to real reform.

The floodwaters of corruption have risen too high. Like in 1986, when the cheating in the snap election turned outrage into action, today’s scandals can also be the breaking point. Constitution or no constitution, the public must insist on two things: a reset and a reckoning.

Only then can we break free from the endless cycle, where the same problems hatch again and again like an unbroken chicken and egg. The lesson of our history is clear: when the people press the reset button and pair it with real justice, change, however imperfect, becomes not just possible but inevitable.

Floods, Corruption, and Snap Elections 2025: 1986 All Over Again?

Introduction

In the Philippines today, the political climate is beginning to echo the upheavals of 1986. Back then, Ferdinand Marcos called a snap election for February 7, 1986, hoping to reassert his mandate. Instead, the widespread perception of massive cheating unleashed a political storm. 

It created an atmosphere of anomic instability—dark clouds of anger, lightning strikes of defection, and gale-force protests—that culminated in the historic People Power uprising later that month. Forty years later, another tempest has emerged with similar volatility: flood control corruption.

If the fraudulent snap election symbolized the arrogance and decay of a dying dictatorship, the billion-peso scandals in flood control projects have come to represent the entrenched rot of governance in our time. The floods are not just natural disasters; they are man-made calamities—storms born of siphoned budgets, substandard infrastructure, and a political class fattened on pork-barrel largesse.

The Parallels: 1986 and 2025

1. Crisis of Legitimacy

1986: Marcos still commanded military loyalty and controlled the electoral machinery, but the brazen fraud of the February 7 snap elections destroyed his moral authority. The cheating became the eye of a storm, destabilizing his rule until the People Power revolution swept him away.

2025: While the ruling coalition still claims strength, the spectacle of ghost dikes, overpriced pumping stations, and favored contractors has eroded confidence. Each downpour exposes the cracks, and every flood swells into a storm of discontent.

2. Middle Class Anger

1986: The urban middle class was jolted awake by the COMELEC walkout and televised fraud. Their outrage gathered like storm clouds and burst into massive street protests.

2025:  Today, it is the middle class that bears the brunt of every flood—cars destroyed, homes submerged, jobs interrupted. Their anger is no longer distant or abstract; it has become a storm surge, rising fast and eroding what little trust remains in government.

3. Fractured Elites

1986: Key figures from business, the Church, and even Marcos’s allies began distancing themselves after the election fraud, sensing the typhoon about to hit.

2025: Cracks are forming in today’s ruling alliances. When the very families who bankroll flood control projects are also the families funding campaigns, political storms brew within the palace gates.

The Differences: 1986 vs 2025

1. The Nature of the Trigger

1986: A single dramatic event—the perception of massive cheating in the February 7 snap elections—ignited a storm of outrage almost overnight.

2025: Corruption in flood control is a slow-burning storm—each rainfall adds water, each ghost project piles wind to the gale. The anger builds cumulatively, not explosively.

2. The Role of Social Media

1986: Newspapers, Radio Veritas, and television acted as storm sirens, rallying people into the streets.

2025: Social media is a swirling whirlwind—spreading outrage instantly, but also dispersing energy, mixing truth with disinformation, and complicating sustained mobilization.

3. The International Context

1986: The Cold War framed Marcos’s regime, and U.S. pressure acted like a typhoon warning, pushing Marcos to the brink.

2025: The geopolitical climate is multipolar, a storm with many winds. The U.S. still wields influence, but China, ASEAN, and global markets now buffet Philippine politics, making external pressure less decisive.

4. Opposition Leadership

1986: Cory Aquino became the calm at the storm’s center—moral, unifying, and steady amid chaos. She gave Filipinos a clear direction for democratic renewal.

2025: The opposition is fragmented, storm-tossed without a unifying figure. Some speculate that Vice President Sara Duterte could assume such a role if her father were to pass away. But unlike Cory, who embodied renewal, Sara is tied to dynastic politics and carries a polarizing legacy. If she does not calm the storm, she may deepen it.

5. The Military Factor

1986: Military defections—Enrile and Ramos breaking away—were lightning bolts that split Marcos’s fortress.

2025: Today’s armed forces are more professionalized, less openly political, but storms of factionalism still swirl beneath the surface. Whether lightning strikes again is uncertain.

6. A Lesser Role for the Church: No Cardinal Sin

1986: Cardinal Jaime Sin’s call over Radio Veritas was the thunderclap that summoned millions to EDSA, lending the storm moral power.

2025: The Church is quieter now, its voice a drizzle compared to the past. We definitely have no Cardinal Sin. Civil society groups, NGOs, and digital networks have become the new storm-bringers.

The Probability of a “Snap Election”

The prospect of a snap election—or its modern variant, an early destabilizing vote—is not far-fetched. History shows Filipinos have little patience for leaders who appear both corrupt and incompetent in times of crisis. The next presidential election, that of May 8, 2028, is two years and seven months away: many of them might not be willing to wait that long. 

But the probability depends on two brewing storm fronts:

Escalation of the Flood Crisis. If another catastrophic flood paralyzes Metro Manila and Central Luzon, exposing shoddy DPWH projects, public outrage could spiral into a typhoon of accountability.

Elite Defection. If key political blocs—business magnates, regional kingpins, even factions within the ruling party—withdraw support, the ruling coalition could collapse like a levee in a storm, just as Marcos’s allies did in 1986.

Projections

Opposition Opportunity. A credible opposition figure could channel the flood narrative as Cory Aquino once harnessed the electoral fraud storm. The challenge: fragmentation and lack of a unifying anchor.

Youth Mobilization. In 1986, students filled the streets; in 2025, youth anger swirls faster through social media, like a tropical storm forming in real time. Viral flood videos may unleash a generational backlash.

Church and Civil Society. Then, the Catholic Church’s pastoral letters shook consciences. Today, civil society groups—engineers, environmentalists, civic clubs—may carry the lightning rod of moral outrage.

What Lies Ahead

Short-Term: Expect protest actions to gather like thunderstorms, framed not in ideology but in urgent demands: “Stop the Flood, Stop the Theft.”

Medium-Term: If corruption exposés multiply, whistleblowers may strike like lightning from DPWH and LGU offices, forcing the regime into a desperate electoral gambit—a premature plebiscite, referendum, or snap election.

Long-Term: Whether or not a snap election is called, the erosion of legitimacy could become a typhoon-force rupture. It may bring a peaceful transition—or a more turbulent reconfiguration involving military adventurism.

Conclusion: The Coming Deluge

In 1986, it was the perception of massive cheating in the February 7 snap election that unleashed the storm that toppled Marcos. In 2025, it may be the floodwaters lapping at doorsteps that spark the next reckoning. 

History does not repeat itself exactly, but rhymes are unmistakeable. And the rhyme of our political history suggests that when Filipinos are battered by both flood and fraud, they will reach for the first lifeboat—be it a snap election, a protest wave, or a revolution by another name.

The danger is that while storms may sweep away rulers, the channels for genuine reform are weaker now than in 1986. With a fragmented opposition, a less assertive Church, and dynasties steering the ship, the lifeboat may drift in circles.

The challenge for Filipinos, then, is not only to weather the storm but also to rebuild institutions strong enough to withstand both the natural disasters and the corruption.