The Philippine Left
Reborn: “Legal Struggle”
Many UP students heeded the UP Office of Student Affairs
(OSA) memorandum in 1973. The memo called for campus organizations deactivated
by martial law to regroup and apply for recognition. The Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP), still smarting from the illegalization of its front
organizations, took the cue. The CPP instructed its UP cadres to establish or
revive as many legal or non-activist student organizations as possible. Setting
aside the propensity of students to organize, this CPP strategy best explains
the rapid proliferation of UP student organizations from 1973 to 1974. With
apologies to Adam Smith, it was as if an “invisible hand” was guiding the
“innocent” UP students to revive their organizations.
This strategic move by the CPP was part of its well
worked-out policy, aptly called “legal struggle.” A product of intense internal
debate, it meant using legal organizations (LOs) to advance its urban political
agenda in UP under martial law. Before martial law, the CPP campaign in UP was
shouldered by CPP led “national-democratic mass organizations” like the Kabataang
Makabayan (KM) and Samahang Demokratiko
ng Kabataan. (SDK) With these organizations banned outright by Proclamation
1081 and operating stealthily, they could not even approximate their
effectiveness in their halcyon days.
In the days of old, recruitment was done almost openly. In
the immediate years before martial law, but especially after the First Quarter
Storm (FQS), thousands of students and community youth joined the great
recruiting machines, ready to be approached by CPP cadres and elevated into formal
affiliation with the party. When Marcos derisively called these organizations
as “CPP front organizations” he was telling the truth.
New Situation
In one fell swoop, martial law did away with the leftist
mass organizations, and squelched the CPP’s hope of further expanding its mass
base. Unfamiliar with an unmasked dictatorship, the CPP showed tentativeness
when it ordered the now illegal organizations to do their routine, albeit in
much shorter durations and with much daring.
These moves failed to generate a groundswell, and severely compromised
security. The predicament was characterized by such problems as, swiftly
dispersed “lightning” rallies, arrests, underground publications of limited
readership, and sluggish recruitment.
Slowly, the awful truth dawned on the CPP ---- the mass
organizations had outlived their usefulness. The emerging channels of
recruitment and propaganda were organizations that were allowed or
tolerated. These were non-activist and
legitimate sounding organizations like academic clubs, fraternities, and
community service groups. The CPP documents had a term for these outwardly
innocuous societies. It called them “open and legal organizations.”
For the time being, at least in UP, all the CPP had going
for it were these organizations.
However, it had to wrestle with their disadvantages. First, they were
not by nature political, so propaganda and indoctrination were hamstrung.
Second, the membership was limited, so recruitment expectations had to be
adjusted. Third, precious cadre time was to be spent on the organizations’ social
and leisure events. And fourth, government agents had infiltrated the
organizations or were closely monitoring their activities.
But the CPP had no choice; it was these groups or none at
all. It wanted to reach out to the UP students
but the groupings it once considered tame and bourgeois were the only
route. The clarion call to its UP
cadres, under the template of “legal struggle,” was to “retire” from their
obsolete mass organizations and follow a new tack. This was the creation or
revival of legal campus organizations.
The CPP cadres were also instructed to create or revive
organizations connected to their respective courses, or to which they had
natural or justifiable ties. Doing so gave them the necessary legal cover, or,
in activist jargon, the “prente."
Once created or revived, their new tasks in these organizations were to
“mingle with the masses” and carry out propaganda and recruitment work in
vastly innovative ways.
“National-Democratic
Core Groups”
And it came to pass that in 1973, the CPP decided that these
tasks were to be done by the “national-democratic core group.” (ND core group) Forming
these core groups was an essential complement to the CPP call to establish or
revive campus organizations. An ND core group was a CPP controlled underground committee
that operated secretly within a mother organization. CPP control was exercised via one or two
cadres. Making up the rest of the group
were three to four “national-democratic activists.” The cadres presided over
the meetings at first, but relinquished this respected position to the
activists once they have demonstrated enough leadership abilities.
After reviving or establishing a legal organization, CPP
cadres scouted the membership for possible recruits. They were on the lookout
for those who were against martial law (AFs), or against “US imperialism,”
(AIs) or against both (NDs). When they had pinpointed their targets, the CPP
cadres engaged in person-to-person organizing. They befriended the subjects,
helped them with their personal problems, hang around with them, gave them
activist reading materials, (“RMs”), and most importantly, discussed politics
with them. This laborious and painstaking method was called the “pakutkut” (to slowly
chip away) method. It demanded immense organizing skills and patience from the
CPP cadres.
The breakthrough period lasted several months, after which
the subjects were introduced to the idea of forming an ND core group. If they
agreed, the subjects, who were now considered organized activists (“may ugnay”),
were given their respective tasks or assignments. They were congratulated on
their new status, and constantly enthused about the worthiness of the cause. The
newly formed ND core group, under the direction of the CPP cadres, then
proceeded to make a plan of activities, or what was called a “tactical
program.” The activities in the tactical program were broadly grouped into
three namely: ideological, political, and organizational.
An ND core group clandestinely tweaked the orientation and
activities of a mother organization, along the guidelines set by the CPP. Its
basic mission was to make the mother organization conduct propaganda activities
that would legally and peacefully follow the political call, or “national-democratic
line” espoused by the CPP. Because of the threat of suppression, these
propaganda activities had to be low key and subtle.
A good example is when Lipunang Pangkasaysayan (History Society) or Likas sponsored the first public address by Senator Jose W. Diokno, after he was released from detention on September 11, 1974. However, there was always the option of increasing the activities' level of militancy, if there was an opportunity.
A good example is when Lipunang Pangkasaysayan (History Society) or Likas sponsored the first public address by Senator Jose W. Diokno, after he was released from detention on September 11, 1974. However, there was always the option of increasing the activities' level of militancy, if there was an opportunity.
To plan for an anti-martial law activity, an ND core group usually
brainstormed in a clandestine meeting, where a CPP memorandum calling for a
political campaign would be discussed and explained by cadres. After the
concept is ironed out, the ND core group makes a plan on how a project will be
carried out, taking pains to adapt the guidelines from the “higher organ” (HO)
to the type and orientation of the mother organization. Examples of these
activities are symposiums, position papers, newsletters, photo exhibits, movie
screenings, and joining issue-based inter-organization alliances.
A more detailed plan is done legally, in a regular or
special meeting of the mother organization. Here, the ND core group members
would arrange for someone under their influence (usually the club president) to
propose the plan to the membership. If the club president was already a member
of the ND core group, then this made things a lot easier.
The plan is usually approved, but if there are objections, ND
core group members do some role playing in explaining and justifying it. Upon
approval of the project or activity, activists and non-activists would be given
assignments and roles. The rule of thumb is for the CPP cadres to have minimum
participation in the activity, with ND core group members and non-activists doing
most of the work. This was the proper way, as the CPP directives would have it,
that the ND core group exercised “political leadership” over legal
organizations.
The CPP cadres’ tasks however, were not limited to organizing
and guiding the ND core group. They were required by the CPP to participate in
the day-to-day activities of the organization. These activities, however boring
or irrelevant to the “grim and determined” CPP cadres, were what attracted the bona
fide members to join the club in the first place.
Specifically, the CPP cadres had to be present in the
organization’s “tambayan” or hang out. They had to initiate activities like
study groups, birthday get-togethers, and peer counseling. As with the members of the ND core group, they
were even expected to advice club members about their romantic relationships or
even financial problems. In CPP jargon, the membership constituted the masses
for the cadres, and, following the Maoist dictum, the cadres must not divorce themselves
from the masses. Through these activities, the CPP instructed its cadres to
establish intimate ties with the membership.
The CPP cadres kept
the ND core group members well supplied with leftist reading materials. The
activists were instructed to digest these materials well so they can
participate actively in underground discussion groups or “ED” sessions. A CPP
cadre usually handled these ED sessions as an instructor, but sometimes the non-CPP
activists or “NDs” were asked to do so, if they showed proficiency.
The standard fare for these discussion groups were Nilo
Tayag’s Komitment, Jose Maria Sison’s
Struggle for National Democracy, Mao
Zedong’s Five Golden Rays and Selected
Quotation from Chairman Mao Zedong, Amado Guerrero’s Philippine Society and Revolution, and, for the national situation,
occasional copies of the CPP’s official
organ Ang Bayan.
Expanding CPP membership was also in the “to do” list of the
CPP cadres. They were under instructions to recruit or “elevate” (iangat)
activists once they have progressed far enough in their standpoint (paninindigan), viewpoint (pananaw) and
method (pamamaraan). There was a trial period, usually a year, in which the new
recruit was a candidate member (kandidatong kasapi or KK).
After this rite of passage, the KK is sworn into full
membership (ganap na kasapi or GK). This slow but steady recruitment effort,
which greatly expanded CPP membership, insidiously went on under the very noses
of the UP authorities, particularly the administration of President Onofre D. Corpuz
and his Executive Vice-president, Emanuel V. Soriano. Before they knew it, they were confronted with
a very adept and assertive UP organizational community, one that had fully
adapted to martial law, thanks in large part to CPP prodding.
This was how the Philippine Left morphed its activities in
UP, to deal with the realities of a newborn martial law. From now on, its corps
of UP cadres was to carry on the fight adroitly concealed in the
“pambansang-demokratikong grupong ubod,” as the ND core groups were called in
Tagalog. They were further protected by the built-in legal status of the
penetrated organization. For good
measure, CPP also deployed cadres in strategic university-wide student bodies
like the Consultative Committee on Student Affairs (Concomsa), and the official
student publication, the Philippine
Collegian. These were very important in conducting campus wide propaganda
and agitation campaigns.
With newfound stealth, the embedded CPP cadres and ND core
groups transformed the various UP student organizations into hybrid anti-martial
law units. After the party was dealt a stunning blow, the ND core groups were
instrumental in enabling the CPP to bounce back as an effective political force
in UP during the 1973-1974 period. The CPP initiated stirrings began in 1975,
first with campus issues, and then with broad national issues. By this time, practically all of the 70 or so
campus organizations in UP had ND core groups.